Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group

Economic Origins of Black Townships in Zimbabwe: Contradictions of Industrial and Financial Capital in the 1950s and 1960s
Author(s): Patrick Bond
Source: *Economic Geography*, Vol. 69, No. 1, African Development (Jan., 1993), pp. 72-89
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/143890
Accessed: 21-03-2018 04:55 UTC

REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/143890?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Economic Geography*

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Economic Origins of Black Townships in Zimbabwe: Contradictions of Industrial and Financial Capital in the 1950s and 1960s*

Patrick Bond
Planact, Johannesburg, South Africa

Abstract: The formative years of black townships in colonial Zimbabwe (then termed Southern Rhodesia) were profoundly influenced by the capital accumulation process. This article contends that, as in the case of advanced capitalist urbanization, the rise of a local financial circuit of capital in the 1950s was instrumental in shifting funds from productive fixed capital investments into the built environment and hence in structuring the urban form of Salisbury, the capital city. This shift had the important difference that it accompanied an emerging overaccumulation crisis in the Southern Rhodesian economy, which became severe in the early 1960s. Credit in this context was initially meant to serve both as a spatial and temporal fix to capital overaccumulation—that is, to displace capital across space and time—and in the process to help cultivate a stable homeowning black working class to assist in a neocolonial political solution. The effort came to naught, however, under the crisis conditions then prevailing: limited effective demand by black consumers and an increasingly untenable distinction between overvalued financial assets and diminishing underlying production and property values. Uneven urban development was exacerbated in the process, the neocolonial compromise was not achieved, and chronic housing shortages in the black townships were assured.

Key words: race, segregation, townships, housing, accumulation, financial capital, industrial capital, capitalist crisis.

According to Soja (1989,101), a central feature of advanced capitalist economies over the past decades was the "need to intervene to reorganise space and to make urban systems function more effectively for the accumulation of capital and the management of social unrest. This brought finance capital more directly into the planning of urban space." Arguing that finance became a "hegemonic force," Harvey (1985, 88) says that "urbanism has consequently been transformed from an expression of the production needs of the industrialist to an expression of the controlled power of finance capital, backed by the power of the state, over the totality of the production process." As such insights gained currency in analyses of advanced capitalist cities, researchers pondered the applicability of political economy to semiperipheral colonial-capitalist urbanization. A lively theoretical debate occurred in South Africa on the origins of black townships, drawing from various conceptions of the relationships between economy, society, and politico-administrative power (see Crush 1991 for a discourse-analytic review); Castells, Harvey, and Foucault are often cited to provide justification for particular interpretations. Controversies center around whether the black township is viewed better from the standpoint of collective consumption and reproduction of labor-power, or capital accumulation, or social control. This relates to the broader

* I thank the anonymous *Economic Geography* reviewers for their constructive suggestions. Financial support from The Johns Hopkins University and the Social Science Research Council is gratefully acknowledged, as is doctoral supervision by David Harvey and Erica Schoenberger. The standard disclaimers apply.

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

question in South African political economic debate of how "functional" the control of black workers was to the manner in which spatial development occurred, a question addressed, in terms of rural-urban migration, by theories of "colonialism of a special type" (South African Communist Party 1989) and "articulations of modes of production" (Wolpe 1980). Entire political programs have been built upon the answers to this question. Similarly, there are important implications for postapartheid development arising from the historical/theoretical debate over past and future urban-economic geography (Lupton 1992). More to the point, finance is increasingly recognized as a central force in shaping that urban future (Swilling 1990; Steinberg, van Zyl, and Bond 1992).

But the debate has not yet begun in neighboring Zimbabwe, reflecting, perhaps, the lack of urban social movements comparable to South Africa's (this was true even during the 1965–79 liberation war) and hence, far less explicitly, political currents in intellectual analysis. "Zimbabwean human geography," notes Zinyama (1988, 74), "still needs to critically question and, where necessary, discard some of its inherited presumptions and to become adventurous enough to explore alternative methodological and philosophical perspectives and analytical tools." To illustrate, virtually all commentators on historical urban development in colonial Zimbabwe (called Southern Rhodesia by British settlers) place the blame for ever-worsening shortages of black housing squarely on the shoulders of an omnipotent government, entirely ignoring the capital accumulation process (Patel and Adams 1981; Drakakis-Smith 1987; Davies and Dewar 1989). In contrast, this article presents evidence that the city of Salisbury (renamed Harare in 1981) offers a clear example of the impact of broader forces of capital accumulation on colonial township development, in particular the powers of finance referred to by Soja and Harvey. Emanating from capitalist crisis tendencies, such dynamics of accumulation ultimately limited the scope and scale of housing provision in Salisbury's townships during the crucial 1950s period of urban industrialization and made it impossible to construct a social contract "partnership" appropriate to neocolonialism.

Therefore, consistent with the political economic approach to advanced capitalist urbanization, this article sets out a framework for considering the origins of Salisbury's black townships. The framework is derived from a historical review of the interests and capacities of particular "fractions of capital," as well as the constrained (not omnipotent) state role in housing provision in the period leading to the Rhodesian Front party's 1962 national electoral victory and 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Fractions are regarded as "circuits of capital"—drawing attention to directions and volumes of flows of funds (van der Pijl 1984, app.)—as opposed to strict institutional entities. In view of the extensive evidence presented, the methodological approach will not be defended here, other than by explaining that the main fractions considered are manufacturing and financial capital, representative of the switch of funding flows that accompanied what may be termed an "overaccumulation crisis" in Southern Rhodesia (refer to the next section). This sets the context in which, from the standpoint of manufacturing capital, the construction of townships reflected the need to reproduce labor power in new ways sensitive to spatial considerations (see the section entitled "Townships as Historical Sites of Labor Reproduction and Sociospatial Control"). Overaccumulation crisis also helps explain the subsequent role expected of financial capital in commodifying housing and ultimately, the futility of such expectations (see "Financial Capital and the Futility of Housing Commodification"). Although it is clear that Salisbury arose under unique circumstances, the strategy followed here might have more universal applicability to Third World cities where

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

there are similar switches in funding flows from productive to financial circuits.

Overaccumulation, Space, Time, and Politics

Overaccumulation is an ever-present tendency in capitalism. This condition signifies that too much fixed capital is invested and too much output is produced, relative not to human needs and the availability of labor but rather to the size of available markets and hence to the opportunity to realize a steady profit. In many semiperipheral settings in the period following World War II, overaccumulation was the result of Import Substitution Industrialization policies that attracted direct investment by multinational corporate producers of luxury consumer goods, leaving economies skewed and "disarticulated" between producers and consumers (de Janvry 1982). In Southern Rhodesia, manufacturing output exploded from £5.1 million in 1938 to £105.1 million in 1957, while doubling as a proportion of GDP (Thompson and Woodruff 1955, 161–81). Foreign direct investment was crucial, rising from £13.5 million in 1947 to £50.7 million in 1951, partly as a function of capital flight subsequent to the Afrikaner nationalists' victory in South Africa (Gann and Gelfand 1964, 212). A third of Britain's largest firms also set up local subsidiaries and, by 1960, claimed two-thirds of all corporate profits generated in Southern Rhodesia (Arrighi 1973, 357). Phimister (1988, 297) reports that foreign capital became "largely associated with the rapidly expanding secondary industrial sector where accumulation rested much more on the extraction of relative rather than absolute surplus value," which, as we shall see, increased the need for a stable, semiskilled labor supply in townships.[1]

Problems of excessive investment in particular sectors were becoming evident in Southern Rhodesia even by the early 1950s. "We are grossly overspent on consumer goods and to a somewhat lesser extent on capital development," complained the colony's monthly business journal *Commerce* in April 1952. A decade later these problems were magnified enormously. Evidence of generalized overaccumulation can be found in the industrial sectors (mining, manufacturing, and electricity) in the form of consistent, enormous year-end inventories, which rose to annual levels of £40 million during a devastating economic recession in 1961–66 that coincided with political uncertainty over the future of Britain's Central African colonies. New manufacturing capital spending in Southern Rhodesia subsequently declined to an annual level of just one-third the 1959 peak (£13.4 million in 1964). The ratio of manufacturing inventories to new fixed capital invested—a ratio that indicates the degree to which overinvestment had occurred—soared from an already high 182 percent in 1958 to 520 percent in 1962 and 600 percent in 1965, while inventories also increased substantially in relation to gross manufacturing output (Central Statistical Office, *Census of Production*, various years; the inventories data series only begins in 1957).

The signal to industrialists was clear: with such high levels of inventories piled up, new investment in productive plant and equipment would not earn a satisfactory return. By 1962 the Association of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Industries complained bitterly of "considerable unutilized capacity" and a major government investigation found that "the problems inhibiting the further expansion of manufacturing are deeply rooted in the small

[1] Reference here is to more capital-intensive processes by which multinational corporations extracted surplus from increasingly productive labor power, in contrast to super-exploitative ("absolute") surplus extraction—speed-up, longer hours, various methods for expanding labor reserves and keeping wages low—that prevailed in existing labor-intensive farming, mining, and light-manufacturing industries.

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

dimensions of the domestic market" (Advisory Committee 1962, 69, 357). In sum, more than a billion pounds was invested in gross capital formation between 1954 and 1962 (including major public works programs financed by the World Bank), but over the same period gross national income rose by just £113 million (Pearson and Taylor 1963, 15–21). Throughout, disproportionalities and uneven development seemed endemic to Southern Rhodesia, and recourse neither to space nor time (through credit) proved sufficiently vigorous to resolve the condition of overaccumulation.

Let us consider aspects of each of these—space and time—in turn. Throughout the 1950s various forms of what Harvey (1982, chap. 13) terms the "spatial fix" were called on to displace overaccumulated capital into new venues for accumulation (such as the northern colonies and the outlying towns in Southern Rhodesia) or into circuits more conducive to investment in the built environment. The formation of the Central African Federation (1954–63) drew Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) into administrative, commercial, and primary commodity circuits of capital centered in Salisbury. As Murray (1970, 193) recounts, "The goal of a closer association between Southern Rhodesia and the colonies to the north was shared by the Federated Chambers of Commerce and the United Party Government, and it was this which, despite periodic crises, attached the Federated Chamber to the government." This also corresponded with shifts in international circuits of capital. As Sir Stafford Cripps of the Labour Party explained, this suited Britain's own postwar interests: "The whole future of the Sterling group and its ability to survive depends in my view upon a quick and extensive development of our African resources. . . . Within the next two to five years we can get a real marked increase of production in coal, minerals, timber, raw materials of all kinds, foodstuffs, and anything else that will save dollars or will sell in a dollar market" (cited in Loney 1974, 86).

There was not only an outward, but also an inward (intranational) expansion of the spatial boundaries of Southern Rhodesian capitalism. Throughout the world, according to Soja (1989,167), "the regional question took on new importance in the 1950s." In most countries, he continues, "awareness of the countervailing spatial strategies of capital . . . was minimal." In Southern Rhodesia, people in the regional hinterlands expressed general dissatisfaction with the geographic distribution of credit, and, according to *Property and Finance* (March 1960), "There was often 'loose talk' that building societies took money from the smaller centers for investment in Salisbury." The result was a growing movement for regional decentralization incentives within Southern Rhodesia; indeed, it was suggested at one national congress of business leaders that "an Industrial Bank is needed to help new industries in small towns" (*Commerce,* September 1955). But, as elsewhere, such geographic palliatives ultimately lost their potency: in the Central African Federation's case largely because of the collapse of the world copper market, and in the case of regional decentralization mainly because, notwithstanding some commercial and industrial diffusion, financial capital flows controlled from Salisbury rarely ventured far afield for small projects or even housing mortgage bonds. Thus it was essentially through built environment investments, mainly in Salisbury, that the overwhelming volume of liquid capital in search of a spatial fix found a short-term rate of return that proved sufficiently attractive.

In part this was a logical result of intensifying geographic concentration of corporate capital—evidenced by the profusion of headquarters of Federation mining houses and other enterprises in Salisbury, the result of transfers from both Lusaka and London (in the latter case due to tax advantages); it also reflected the centralization of capital in a variety of new financial institutions such as merchant

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

banks and discount houses during the 1950s. These were initially introduced in Salisbury by mining houses in the process of diversification (especially the Rhodesian Selection Trust and South Africa's Anglo American Corporation) and by their associated London, New York, Parisian, and Brussels financial allies: Rothschild, Lazard Brothers, Philip Hill, Higginson, Banque Lambert, Dillon Read, and Gillett Brothers. Foreign insurance companies proliferated, and local building societies prospered. The local stock market, born in 1946, claimed nearly a hundred registered companies within a decade. In addition to the well-entrenched Standard Chartered Bank and Barclays Bank, three other foreign banks (National and Grindlays, Ottoman, and the Netherlands Bank of South Africa) set up local subsidiaries during the 1950s (Grant-Suttie 1965; Sowelem 1967).

Office headquarters built for these institutions in the late 1950s were as spectacular as any on the African continent (Bond 1992b). Historically, serious speculators were no strangers to Salisbury, where at the turn of the century (within a decade of the initial colonial settlement), 40 percent of Central Business District land was already controlled by just five companies. Land and mining speculation was rife across the young colony, powered by city of London investments (Christopher 1970; van Onselen 1976, 14; Phimister 1988, chap. 1), and in Salisbury speculators purchased whole blocks in some cases, and alternative sites in others, "so as to control any development that might take place" (Christopher 1977, 18). "Land values therefore reflected aspirations rather than reality, and were often considerably in excess of the value of improvements." The fresh wave of building and land speculation during the 1950s had its origin not in an attempt to "control" the path of spatial development but instead in the underlying dynamic of an ascendant financial circuit of capital concomitant with emerging overaccumulation crisis in the productive economy. One skyscraper after another was constructed to house financial institutions, to the point where they occupied 13 percent of office space in the CBD core (Smout 1971, 91). The surge of CBD investments generated growing concern:

> The biggest single item of investment over the last few years of rapid development in Salisbury has been the purchase of central city property and the building of multistorey shops and office blocks. With so much outside capital, as well as internal investment capital, being sunk in this type of property, many people are asking whether the provision of new offices is not being overdone. (*Property and Finance*, September 1957)

Indeed, the spatial fix afforded by built environment investments, mediated by financial capital, soon collapsed. From 1958 to 1964, the annual value of planned new commercial buildings fell from £12 million to £2 million. New housing construction dropped from £16 million in 1956 to £1.3 million in 1962. The number of mortgage bonds of all types dropped from a peak of 7,654 in 1957 to 3,048 in 1961 (Central Statistical Office, *Bulletin of Statistics*). A government commission explained the relationship of the built environment to the productive economy:

> In a hectic investment boom, when incomes are growing rapidly, it is inevitable that scarce capital resources should frequently be misdirected, or that surplus capacity should emerge because of the failure of the economy to grow at some anticipated rate. This is undoubtedly the situation in Southern Rhodesia, which today possesses an agglomeration of buildings, merchanting, retailing, banking, power and other productive facilities constructed to meet the demands of a substantially larger volume of activity. (Advisory Committee 1962, 15)

As overaccumulation passed from productive to financial/speculative circuits during this period, a wide-reaching financial regulatory apparatus was introduced (Bond 1992a, app. 1). In arguing the case for a reserve bank (ultimately founded in 1956), it was the opinion of the chief statistician of Southern Rhodesia that "the

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

net effect of the banks' operations is to accentuate booms and slumps" (Central Statistical Office 1948, 4). By the late 1950s, credit and exchange controls were used with increasing vigor by reserve bank technocrats imported from London and Pretoria. One concern of monetary authorities was the prevailing loose standard of credit creation; the ratio of the banks' local assets to their total assets (i.e., including offshore holdings with parent banks) exceeded 80 percent in 1957, up from 20 percent in 1945 (Barber 1961, 166). By the late 1950s white Rhodesians borrowed twice as much per capita on hire purchase as did Britons. And representatives to the first (1958) meeting of the Association of Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia and Nyasaland claimed that "the credit system had got completely out of hand." They continued:

> Both commerce and industry had been over-encouraged by the "beckoning hand" of the banks, who had until recently extended over-generous credit facilities. There had also been a considerable growth of finance houses designed to discount hire purchase facilities, and nothing had been done to discourage new ones setting up in business in the Federation. . . . The blame for the present position lay equally with merchants for overtrading, and with the commercial banks which had extended credit facilities on too big a scale when the price of copper was high. (*Property and Finance,* May 1958)

As with the spatial fix, the credit-based "temporal fix" (Harvey 1982, chap. 10)—engineered through an expansion of financial instruments that permit consumption in the present on the basis of expected future surplus value extraction—now also experienced its own limits. Paralleling the collapse of property investments, the early 1960s saw a broader consumer and corporate financial shakeout in which hire purchase contracted by 25 percent, bond repayment arrears for the entire country reached 18 percent (as compared to a level of just 3 percent even in the turbulent late 1970s) (*Herald,* 22 March 1979), while the number of building societies shrank from eight to three:

> It might be fair to ask whether the Federation's young money market has not become top-heavy in relation to the country's economy. The recession has disclosed serious over-trading in most sectors, and it could well be that lending by financial institutions, based on a "boom" situation thought optimistically to be long-lived, has represented too much too soon. (*Property and Finance,* August 1960)

At this stage, distinguishing between fractions of circulating capital (not just institutions) is useful for several reasons: to gauge the different dynamics unfolding in the economy, the importance of political arrangements on profitability in certain sectors, and the implications of economics and politics for the development of townships. The emerging national manufacturing bourgeoisie is generally viewed as having greater influence over the Southern Rhodesian state from the 1930s (Leys 1959; Handford 1976, 161). Even before attempts were launched to create a black middle class as negotiating partners for Kenya-style neocolonialism (the "Partnership" program of the late 1950s), there was a prior concern by far-sighted politicians like Prime Minister Garfield Todd, based on their connections to fast-growing manufacturing industries. "The problem here," Arrighi argues (1973, 361), "was the stabilization of the proletariat, because the high rate of turnover associated with migratory labor retarded specialization within the manufacturing sector." Several major liberal proposals were aimed at addressing the lack of urban permanence in the working class. One was the establishment of an urban minimum wage, opposed by the agrarian bourgeoisie due to the impact it would have on their labor costs. Another route to stabilization of the urban areas, supported in particular by Todd, was rural land reform. Though these important sets of reforms were thwarted, other attempts were made to structure black townships, particularly those relating to the provision of housing, which were more suited to the

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

broader macroeconomic condition of excess financial liquidity prevailing in the late 1950s.

Liberal strategists encouraged financiers to overcome traditional barriers to the provision of credit to blacks for housing or small business purposes. A leading insurance company executive attempted to transform several black nationalist leaders into bankers by sponsoring "friendly societies" for the purpose of holding savings and granting small loans. Ex-Prime Minister Todd attempted the same in 1964. Both efforts failed ignominiously, taking many black savings accounts down simultaneously, as did a British Conservative Party parliamentarian's effort in 1961 to promote a "Bank of Africa" in order "to counter possible nationalist demands for the expropriation of European assets. . . . African realization of the importance of a sound banking system would influence British investors who fear expropriation" (*Property and Finance*, April 1961, December 1961, July 1962, June 1963, March 1964). An expert Advisory Committee on the Development of the Economic Resources of Southern Rhodesia (1962, 54) also believed it had identified a crucial approach to unifying an increasingly untenable urban-rural "dualism" and to modernizing the black economy—the expansion of the financial circuit: "At the risk of being criticized for seemingly overplaying the theme of credit, we must once again state how much importance we place upon the provision of adequate, soundly administered credit."

But although evidence drawn mainly from business sector discourses during the 1950s and early 1960s suggests that there was no lack of understanding or collective desire to increase financial flows to black townships (and rural areas), the manner in which this was carried out (in relation to levels of affordability in the context of declining state subsidies) made the project unviable. Township development ultimately depended relatively little on the capacity of those with nominal control of the state to legislate in favor of the interests of manufacturing capital (as with the case of the reforms Arrighi identifies). Much more important, as we shall see, were the limits imposed by weak effective demand, added to deep-rooted, contradictory dynamics in the cycle of capital accumulation.

Townships as Historical Sites of Labor Reproduction and Sociospatial Control

The efforts of manufacturing capital to shape township development are quite instructive, for particularly during the 1950s this entailed sorting out several conflicting questions:

- Who would pay the necessary *collective consumption* costs of labor reproduction (particularly provision of a minimal supply of housing), given the stage of industrial accumulation Southern Rhodesia had entered?
- What role would *social control* play in this reproduction process, given the transition in the justification for domination from health and sanitation to work-time discipline to the need to counter nationalism as a political threat?
- How could divergent rationales for blacks' *spatial location*—based on industrial production, labor reproduction and residential racial segregation—be harmonized?
- What prospects were there for *commodifying housing* as a separate route for both petty-bourgeoisification and construction industry accumulation?

The construction of black townships during the 1950s was to some degree based on ruling class awareness of the international experience in worker housing and on attempts at reconciling conflicting goals, interests, and actions of micro-actors such as the police, health workers, missionaries, and residents. Moreover, the local base of experience in township planning was weak. Situated four kilometers from the capital's town

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

center, Harari was the first urban area (486 hectares) set aside for African residence by the Salisbury Council, initially consisting of 50 huts made from leftover iron drums. Supposed fears about health and security helped codify strict segregation between the races, although many urban Africans lived and worked as domestic servants in "European" parts of town. Only when the postdepression upturn required increasing numbers of urban industrial workers did city planners prepare 453 detached houses in Highfield, accommodating some 2,500 people. During World War II the combination of rapid industrialization, absence of many white workers serving as soldiers, high levels of poverty in the rural areas, and the Compulsory Native Labor Act increased black urbanization by 10 percent annually. However, there was scant housing market response to the influx. Average monthly wages of slightly over £1 were half the minimum sustenance level for a household of four, and two-thirds of the black workers were forced to take accommodations from their employers. An urban housing crisis immediately developed, according to Mafico (1987, 5), because "African housing was not a lucrative investment and the building trade was virtually a white monopoly." Restrictions also limited the numbers of unemployed people in the urban areas, a problem which had been blamed for a black general strike in 1948.

By the early 1950s, only 28,000 of some 75,000 blacks living in Salisbury had access to municipal housing, while another 17,000 were domestic servants living with their employers (Mafico 1987, 7). Many more women and children joined the traditionally male population in the towns, comprising 40 percent of all blacks by the end of the 1950s. The government was forced to orient new black housing development toward female and married accommodation. Nevertheless, while a large backlog developed and official rents remained the same for single and married accommodations, the hated migrant labor hostel system persisted; many families were forced to become lodgers in other black households, fostering petty divisions within the proletariat.

The evolving treatment of African women in the townships is telling. In the early days, women active as prostitutes had a relatively easy time gaining access to housing as a result of deals with local police. Over time women were increasingly controlled by male relatives, and their sexual behavior became regulated. Although there is evidence that patriarchy was bolstered by specific state policies (Schmidt 1991), Barnes (1992a, 588) argues that "restricting the mobility of women had become an unworkable policy by the mid-1930s." Urban employment had mainly been limited to domestic service, and opportunities for petty accumulation were limited to beer-brewing, prostitution, and, in the M'popoma township of Bulawayo, rental of township rooms (women did have rights to rent up to six market stands from the authorities there, although not in Salisbury). However, according to Barnes (1992b, 5), legislation gradually began to "define their positions, rights and duties inside the evolving institutions of marriage in order to move African family relationships into line with the new capitalist economy. . . . It was policy to manipulate custom and tradition ('to bolster up tribal ways, to try to maintain the past . . .') so as to develop manageable flows of labor to the colony's capitalist enterprises."

Reproduction of labor also depended upon the forms and functions of urban spatial organization. Writing in *Commerce* (August 1952), B. G. Abrahams argued, "We set up towns and industries requiring the employment of large numbers of Natives and it is up to us to find a [housing] solution satisfactory to all." Tobacco processing was responsible for employment of "by far the largest" group of blacks in Salisbury, a total of 6,000 in 1953. Of these, 2,000 workers had been housed in compounds erected before 1946, while another 1,000 lived in Harari and the rest were temporary workers. Most workers

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

> [are] housed on the industrialist's premises and are under his direct control. Consequently, absenteeism and desertion have been kept at a very low level, and under the direction of the municipal health authorities, the proper care of the employee has been the direct responsibility of the employer. If, under some other scheme the industry's employees are to be housed some distance from their place of employment, the consequent lack of control and adequate transport facilities would lead to excessive absenteeism, late arrival and dissatisfaction among the employees to an extent that may well cripple the industry. (*Commerce*, July 1953)

This, then, was the dilemma for the industrialists of Salisbury. On the one hand, the direct employee housing costs to tobacco employers for 4,000 workers (the seasonally adjusted average) were £1 per month and rising, which "would mean that approximately £48,000 a year would be added to the cost of a commodity in which Southern Rhodesia is endeavouring to compete on the world's markets" (*Commerce*, July 1953). On the other hand, there were dual problems of location (and hence transport) and discipline. Transport alone cost most workers between 18 percent and 30 percent of their monthly incomes, and by 1956 black dissatisfaction with the system led to a violent bus boycott and 200 arrests. Quite early on, Abrahams tried to spell out the role of townships in the spatial layout of white cities:

> The ideally situated urban location would be near the place of work, and well away from Europeans, but as the bulk of the work will have been created by Europeans, they and the Native's of work are likely to be close at hand. . . . Both [colonial] Belgian and South African authorities, after many years' experience, are convinced that the most satisfactory solution is the creation of a "buffer belt" between the European and the Native area. The Colony's Town Planners would appear to hold this view as it is believed they intend to utilize the industrial area as a "buffer belt" between the European residential area and the Native location in the new Norton Township. (*Commerce*, August 1952)

The operative principle was that "the rate of development of the Native townships will be in proportion to the degree of industrial expansion" (*Commerce*, October 1953). Thus more than half the black workers could travel to work by bicycle, while another 15 percent walked (Central Statistical Office 1965, 11). But with prime industrial land becoming scarcer and more costly, a Salisbury Council anxious to promote economic development began to stretch both its legal powers and the limits of already overcrowded townships:

> Large new African townships are inseparable from industrial development: thus, there is a very close link between land requirements for the two purposes. The proposed new Ford factory alone will require housing for 400 African employees, and the Southern Rhodesia Government rightly insists that land to be made available [by the Salisbury Council] for industrial housing must be thrice the area of actual or potential industrial sites. (*Property and Finance*, March 1960)

There was an increase in interurban entrepreneurial competition between the towns of the Central African Federation at the time. "Municipalities sold industrial land too fast and are faced with the problem of shortage of both land and finance for African housing," according to an impatient Select Committee on Resettlement of Natives in Southern Rhodesia in 1959 (cited in Advisory Committee 1962, 390). Two additional townships were recommended for both Salisbury and Bulawayo, housing several tens of thousands of blacks.

Geographic barriers intervened. "The question of siting is even more explosive. While it is obviously sensible that labor should be housed (and should have recreational facilities) near places of work, the Europeans whose property is near the 'scheduled zones' are the first to object" (*Property and Finance*, October 1959). Salisbury's southern industrial districts were able only to expand in the vicinity of lower-income white suburbs, and residents there were reportedly hostile to the prospect of neighboring black townships.

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

By 1961, as the economic slump deepened, many white residents in the "cheap development" at Southerton simply walked away from their houses and bonds, in part because the suburb bordered on the expanding areas of Highfield, thus creating a "real headache" for building societies and for remaining residents (*Property and Finance,* June 1961).

In addition to spatial location, the discipline of the black worker also informed the construction of townships. Rational spatial planning, the embedding of bourgeois social norms, and workplace-control methods were perfected in many capitalist settings during the 1950s. Southern Rhodesia was not immune, as the spatial question began to mesh with the industrialists' evolving approach to black social and residential conduct. As one delegate to an industrialists' congress in 1953 put it:

> It is our concern to establish the African in the urban areas, principally for our own purposes. Now, if we make it possible for him to become thoroughly urbanized and let him own land in the urban areas, he will not want to go back to the reserve. He will be able to build and reestablish something of vital importance to this Colony—that is the African family unit. By reestablishing that unit you are going to solve two other major social evils. You are going a long way towards eliminating juvenile delinquency and prostitution. (*Commerce,* September 1953)

The physical task of constructing sufficient housing was never successfully accomplished, however, and thus neither was industry's need for pacified labor satisfied. A better articulation of consumer demand with labor supply surely would have encouraged the local construction industry to provide an appropriately priced product. Early on it seemed that sufficient effective demand might develop among blacks (who, all told, earned £20 million in the money economy in 1953) so that at least a privileged few might gain access to a commodified housing market. The industrialists' congress unanimously adopted a resolution to this effect:

> Congress recognizes that there are today Africans who have reached a degree of education and culture far beyond the mass of their fellows and strongly urges that suitable land be made available within urban areas so that housing and recreational facilities can be provided by private enterprise commensurate with the degree of advancement of this section of the population. (*Commerce,* September 1953)

There were interesting prospects here for black housing to serve as a new route for capital accumulation, but meager progress was made on this front, partly as a result, policymakers hypothesized, of a lack of formal housing finance available to blacks prior to 1958. The cheapest government house cost the government £354, the most expensive £476 (Advisory Committee 1962, 389). At £515 for a commercially constructed four-room detached house in 1960 (including separate meters for water and electricity), "the total is quite beyond the normal capacity of an African to pay" (*Property and Finance,* March 1960). In addition to a £3 monthly charge for services, the minimum monthly rental fee for a detached home was £4, whereas at the time Salisbury employers typically were paying more than £2 per month for their workers' housing. A government survey of black households (excluding single men) living in Salisbury found that in the early 1960s, as in the 1950s, "Nearly two thirds of householders were either provided with free housing, or were assisted by their employers for the full amount or part of the rent" (averaging between £2 and £5 per month) (Central Statistical Office 1965, 8). The emerging consensus was that effective demand could only be augmented through credit. For although the industrialists' dilemma concerning how to manage the conflicting requirements of elemental labor reproduction, social control, and spatial conflicts was never solved, during the course of the 1950s employers nevertheless succeeded in taking a diminishing financial responsibility for their workers' housing, while private sector financiers were persuaded

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

to attempt to transform the living conditions of black urbanites.

Financial Capital and the Futility of Housing Commodification

With manufacturing industries still expanding and government unable to respond effectively to an official black housing backlog estimated at £11 million (Advisory Committee 1962, 390), it was clear by the late 1950s that the transfer of the burden of reproducing the urban work force would have to be assumed by all institutions available, including the building societies. In 1935, at the end of the local depression, Southern Rhodesia's first building society, the Midlands Building and Investment Society, was founded in the colony's fourth largest town. As Clive Wright, general manager of the Central African Building Society, noted, "Compared with other British territories building societies were slow to catch on in the Rhodesias. This was unfortunate, as they missed the war-time boom that gave a tremendous impetus to the movement in other countries" (*Property and Finance,* March 1956). In 1948, the colony would claim just two other building societies in addition to Midlands, neither based in Salisbury. But postwar immigration—with savings accounts bolstered by wartime consumption constraints—led to the formation of nine new societies during the subsequent three years. A Building Society Act passed in 1952 opened the way for share deposits in building societies, which had built their meager asset bases on savings and fixed deposits. "Indeed, whereas previously societies had depended on small investors and savers for support, corporations and large investors began to come forward with their funds" (*Property and Finance,* March 1956). The average Federation building society deposit reached £82 per head by 1956, compared with £37 in Britain and £62 in the United States, assisted by "large institutional investments from outside the territory" (*Property and Finance,* March 1957). Indeed, Beverley Building Society was soon acquired by Pearl, a British insurance firm.

The building societies played a crucial ideological role in the subsequent campaign to make blacks homeowners. As Wright, then leader of the Building Societies Association of Southern Rhodesia, put it:

> A brief glance at the history books will show that wherever these institutions have been allowed to develop, social revolution has been gradual and has not taken a violent form. In fact, it is these countries which today form the major bulwark against the spread of communism. Home ownership is the priceless heritage and practical aim of most English-speaking peoples. Compare this with the teeming millions of the earth's population who can never hope to achieve this object. (*Property and Finance,* March 1956)

For white immigrants, the building societies had extended certain European working-class traditions that transferred well to Southern Rhodesia during the postwar era of economic expansion. Wright called housing (for whites) "probably the most important single feature of our development economy in the Federation" (*Property and Finance,* June 1956). Generous 90 percent government loan guarantees played a major role in the extension of property ownership, covering more than 6,000 building society loans worth £23 million by 1962 (Advisory Committee 1962, 389). The system began to break down, however, when extended to a much lower income group.

As economic growth slowed, state subsidies for blacks also declined. Direct expenditures on housing by the Southern Rhodesian government fell from a peak of £1.8 million in 1956–57 to just £375,000 a year later. Even local government found itself facing shortfalls of external finance during these crucial years, as loans raised by municipalities shrank from £5 million in 1956–57 to £3 million the next year, with even lower amounts registered during the early 1960s (Advisory Committee 1962, 84). Government thus turned to the

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

private sector and, through legislation arising from the 1958 Plewman Commission, societies were empowered to offer, for the first time, mortgage bonds to blacks on residential or commercial properties carrying 99-year leasehold tenures. Such tenures had become legal two years earlier, but even long-term leasehold was deemed insufficient by Plewman:

> By restricting access to land, the chance of creating what is universally regarded as the most conservative element in society—those who own land and property—is being lost and a footloose mass of human beings is coming into existence not because the people themselves are inclined towards that mode of life but because the laws do not allow them to develop otherwise. (Plewman Commission report, cited in Patel and Adams 1981, 10)

Some officials nevertheless expressed high hopes for extending housing bonds on the basis of leasehold. According to the minister of Local Government and Housing, the target market for the new borrowing privileges would be "the middle-lower income group and the upper-income group"; and, in the cases of Highfield and M'popoma townships:

> We have also encouraged banks to open branches there, and building societies have already commenced business. In Highfield alone, Africans themselves have already invested some £50,000 in what I call the commercial center. This has been financed by them themselves, but they have in recent months come to me and said, if in their wisdom they would like to take a mortgage on fixed property they should be entitled to do so. (*Property and Finance*, April 1958)

The minister continued: "The banks have thus been reluctant in some cases, although they have made loans in others, to agree to an overdraft or indeed, to agree to a first mortgage." In fact, building society reluctance to devote the necessary resources to the townships stemmed, first, from their unfamiliarity with a generally impoverished customer base that all bankers (and other lenders) had traditionally refused credit. As *Property and Finance* (May 1955) put it, "Credit is certainly not indispensable to sound retailing; it is virtually unknown in one of the healthiest branches of commerce in this country—the native trade." Second, during this period an extremely tight central bank credit squeeze, combined with South African currency controls, caused funding for Southern Rhodesian building societies to dry up. From mid-1958 to mid-1959, building societies were drained of £4 million by Reserve Bank controls (*Property and Finance*, May 1959). Thus, according to Wright at year-end 1958, "The Southern Rhodesian Government is expecting building societies to take a hand in financing African homeownership. There has also been a minor public clamour for a reduction in the mortgage interest rate. Without more and cheaper money neither of these objectives can be accomplished" (*Property and Finance*, January 1959).

Within a few months credit restrictions were withdrawn and the cheaper money arrived. According to one subsequent report, "African borrowers with the necessary legal security and financial capacity to meet the repayments involved" received credit from the Founders Building Society, for example, "although the numbers were small" (*Property and Finance*, October 1959). Founders also made available £229,000 for government-sponsored black housing. But industry and government were not satisfied with such a half-hearted contribution:

> There is a great deal of surplus cash in the country. . . . The building societies are anxious to stimulate as much as possible a building trade now very much in the doldrums; and in this stimulation, they have the sympathy of the Government. They are not unduly worried over the general fall in demand for bonds for European housing: as announced in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament, African home-ownership schemes will offer an outlet for their surplus funds, and demand from Asian and Coloured people is growing steadily. (*Property and Finance*, August 1959)

Another spur to the societies was that

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

the Salisbury City Council, which administered township accounts with federal monies, failed to receive an £800,000 federal housing commitment in early 1960. The council quickly lobbied for homeownership and private construction:

> This principle means that, willy-nilly, all those Africans who can afford to pay for their own houses will be encouraged to the utmost. It also means the eventual granting of freehold title, at least in selected African urban areas and the consequential amendment of the Land Apportionment Act. (*Property and Finance,* March 1960)

The proposal to permit full black homeownership (not just the 99-year leases) coincided with increasingly hospitable money market conditions. With a general slump in demand for credit stemming from industrial overinvestment and the waning of the property boom in both the CBD and the white suburbs, building societies and institutional investors were again excessively liquid, if only temporarily. Thus, in early 1960, the building societies "warmly welcomed the opportunity to invest embarrassingly-large surplus funds in Government-sponsored schemes for black housing, which came indeed as a blessing at a time when normal 'European' demand for mortgages had fallen off steeply" (*Property and Finance,* March 1961).

There remained, however, the crucial problem of effective demand. The fact that Southern Rhodesia's urban proletariat was severely underpaid was a substantial barrier to the normal operations of business societies. Myth-making continued unabated: "A small, select, virtually 'European' suburb will be established for those who, like people of all races, wish to get away from the hoi-polloi," *Property and Finance* announced in November 1960. "Africans will also be able to obtain freehold title to land, a provision of great psychological importance." But this was not a legitimate model for widescale credit allocation to blacks, as there was not much of a separate upper-income black group to speak of. A government survey conducted in 1963 and 1964 found that a quarter of black workers in Salisbury involved in the "production process" and as craftsworkers earned just £16 per month, while another fifth were transport and communication workers whose wages were not much higher (£19). A further 17 percent were poorly paid (£15) service workers. In contrast, the tiny classes of "professional, technical and related workers" (3 percent of the population) and "administrative, executive and managerial workers" (0.4 percent) earned £25 per month, while clerical workers (6 percent) received £21. This proved an insufficient basis for a substantial homeowning population, given that average monthly household expenditures amounted to £18.9 as against an average monthly income of £19.4. Household overcrowding was the rule, and rural-urban migratory patterns continued to exert a heavy influence, so that disposable income quickly disappeared. Indeed, the so-called "hoi-polloi" were everywhere, and average household incomes in the different Salisbury townships were remarkably consistent, varying by not more than 8 percent from the "elite" Mufakose district to the older ghetto of Highfield (Central Statistical Office 1965, 7–11).

Given the painstakingly slow method of granting individual housing bonds under such conditions, financiers instead helped engineer a controversial system for pumping large amounts of funds into townships via private builders under government guarantee, termed "contractor-finance." Again, hopes were high. One business report judged this system "the last opportunity to retain a sphere of influence in black housing, which is undeniably of very considerable importance to the industrial development of the city" (*Property and Finance,* March 1960). It worked as follows: the construction of the housing or site development would be completed over the course of a year, and payments by the black buyers (typically through their employers) would take four years. In a test case, a leading contractor-finance firm, Laing Development (Rhodesia) Ltd,

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

offered to build £1,000 houses for the Farmers' Co-op Ltd, which would rent the houses to employees, with the possibility of future purchase. But serious problems arose in the early stages, ranging from the question of the constitutional mandate for housing provision (which led to a temporary halt in such financing) (*Property and Finance, July* 1960) to an official government financial opinion that contractor-financing was "unorthodox" (*Property and Finance,* July 1965). The Federation finance minister labeled contractor-financing "an unwise excursion into the fringe of respectability" and ridiculed those who considered the method "a sort of financial sputnik which makes all other financial armament obsolete" (*Property and Finance,* February 1961).

In the end, the local financiers failed to pick up where industrialists and the state had left off. Most important was the crisis in deposit funding (especially fixed deposits) for building societies caused by withdrawal of foreign accounts and the general demise of financial liquidity, which quickly made itself felt in a dramatic fall in new bonds registered by building societies, from 1,913 in 1960 to just 370 in 1961. Additionally, doing business in the townships, where political emotions were getting hotter while effective demand remained cool, was not what the comfortable Salisbury financiers had in mind. The combination of nationalist discontent, economic recession, and poor living conditions sparked riots in July 1960. Given the lack of business opportunities in the stagnant Southern Rhodesian economy, the effect was to provoke another dramatic surge of capital flight, which hit building societies hard: "As in many businesses, policies have been based largely on boom conditions and on a 'sky's the limit' psychology which encouraged overextension of activity and put no premium on efficiency or shrewd operation," commented *Property and Finance* (March 1961). Indeed, the building society trade association had recently heard a presidential address that called for increased reserves against losses and reductions in expenses, "extensive" levels of advertising, and "the building of attractive premises" (*Property and Finance,* January 1960). As the financial rationalization wave intensified in 1962, the societies' vision of drawing blacks into their circuit of capital waned; notwithstanding the financiers' generally liberal intentions, this contributed to the sense of resignation about broader prospects for a modernizing, neocolonial solution to the colony's political crisis.

The mismatch of growing needs, raised expectations, and shrinking government resources allocated to fulfilling them during the Partnership era precluded a state solution. Ironically, during this period financial capital was most liquid and urbanization was most geared to the expansion of industry, and thus the greatest resources existed for housing provision. Yet the opportunity for developing a partnership between state and capital capable of incorporating as junior partners urban blacks otherwise susceptible to radical nationalist agitation was lost.

Conclusion: Finance and Populism

We may conclude that Salisbury's townships were cemented in their present sociospatial form by several factors working at cross-purposes in the 1950s and early 1960s. The growing class of manufacturing capitalists attempted to engineer a shift from direct supply of housing for their employees to an indirect supply as the key component in the general reproduction of labor-power. Unable to accomplish this class project on their own, or even through their powerful business association, they and state policymakers acceded to other visions—namely, utilizing capitalism's spatial (built environment) and temporal (credit-granting) features to encourage black homeownership through the formal financial system, which was temptingly liquid at different points in the late 1950s. In the process, what van der Pijl (1984, 33) has referred to as a "money

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

capital concept"—that is, "a more or less general awareness that society is in a particular condition, and that it is in need of a 'bankers' solution,' because the situation elicits 'bankers' arguments'"—was generated.

We have seen the ways in which such a solution affected urban development in Southern Rhodesia, ranging from the power of finance over the built environment, to various efforts aimed at indebting blacks, including constructing a black financial petty bourgeoisie through friendly societies. For a time building societies showed a willingness to transfer overaccumulated capital from liquid portfolios into black housing. But when it was clear that this market faced overwhelming effective demand constraints—in a context of worsening stagnation, slumping employment growth, and declining state subsidies—the "bankers' solution" failed. Thus the only road to a closer articulation of production and consumption—via a liberal Partnership social contract based on the malleability of a debt-ridden urban black working class with middle-class ambitions—was blocked. Indeed, by failing to provide for black townships Southern Rhodesian financiers demonstrated the limits of both the spatial and temporal fixes to the overaccumulation and political crises. These limits further exacerbated the racially divisive conditions governing the reproduction of labor. This in turn contributed to the conditions spurring left-wing black populism and, a few years later, armed guerrilla resistance.

In the white areas, too, the overaccumulation crisis and accompanying ascendance and subsequent decline of finance, had tremendously uneven effects on development. Consider some political implications. Along with the cooling of credit creation and speculative real estate fires from 1960 or so onward, there was a decline in what might be considered the "social power" of money relative to that of other forces—in particular, white farmers and the now-threatened white working class, the petty bourgeoisie, and many in the civil service. Since this underlying economic transition accompanied the crucial political conjuncture of "winds of change" in colonial Central Africa, the power of finance gave way neither to national industrial capital (which would not emerge from its condition of overaccumulation until later in the decade) nor to international industrial capital (which had effectively saturated most available markets) nor to a neocolonial black petty bourgeoisie (as happened elsewhere on the continent), but instead to a centrally directed state capitalism based on the interests of national agrarian capital and a lower and middle strata of whites.

The state capitalist outcome was more profound precisely because of the prior role of finance in uneven development. Following the path trod by 1950s liberals in search of financial stability, the increasingly interventionist Rhodesian Front government of the 1960s and 1970s more forcefully applied extensive technical leverage—exchange and credit controls and then investment directives, including prescribed assets requirements reaching 60 percent—to banks, finance houses, and insurance companies. The Rhodesian Front could build into that white nationalist alliance a zealous ingenuity surprisingly capable of withstanding any effort by either local or international circuits of capital (especially financial) that threatened to undermine the project; as a result, very little subsequently could be done to apply financial sanctions against Rhodesia or to encourage political change from within supported by liberal financiers (Handford 1976).

The situation had built up inexorably from the 1950s in a manner "strikingly similar to what happened south of the Limpopo" with the advent of National Party rule in 1948 (Arrighi 1973, 364). In South Africa the backdrop was also one of weakened "English-speaking" finance in the 1940s, in the wake of the financial chaos of the Great Depression and an upsurge of Afrikaner populist resistance against long traditions of discrimination by the London banks (Davenport 1966; O'Meara 1983; Mabin 1985; Keegan 1986;

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Giliomee 1989). Likewise, the rise of the Rhodesian Front, Arrighi (1973, 367) concludes, "was directed as much against large-scale capitalism as against the Africans. The populist undertones of the UDI campaign were very noticeable."

Underlying the political dynamics in Southern Rhodesia was a particular stage of capital accumulation in the 1950s and early 1960s: rising overaccumulation in industry, accompanied by the inordinate and inappropriate flow of funds from productive into financial assets (including property), followed by their inordinate withdrawal in a manner that accentuated existing boom-bust tendencies and uneven geographic development. How then does this stage of accumulation relate to the process of urbanization? As noted by Harvey at the outset, the rise of finance was important in the transformation of urbanism elsewhere during this period. But in Southern Rhodesia the particular conditions of overaccumulation partially displaced through space and time and mediated by finance, under circumstances of constrained effective demand, demonstrate the limits of colonial capitalism in providing basic needs goods (such as housing).

These conditions are evident also in the early 1990s in Zimbabwe, where foreign funds have flowed from the World Bank and commercial banks into various development projects and an "Economic Structural Adjustment Programme" (Bond 1991). This has coincided with a local overaccumulation crisis, featuring a manufacturing investment drought since 1976, inordinate financial speculation (culminating in a 1991–92 65 percent stock market crash and 35 percent real estate price decline), increasing income differentiation among the populace, and the rise of right-wing political formations (including the revival of Ian Smith in a black-white conservative front). Popular resistance has been essentially ineffectual. In South Africa, in contrast, alongside intellectual debates over the interpretation of the township, there is an urban social movement (township "civic associations") hotly contesting similar conditions of overaccumulation crisis, rising finance, and uneven development (Bond 1994). Whether (in either case) conflict between underlying processes of accumulation and social organization reasserts itself as a right-wing populist outcome, or whether a left-wing populist response from poor and working-class people can be expanded and sustained, is still very much a matter for struggle to decide.

References

Advisory Committee on the Development of the Economic Resources of Southern Rhodesia. 1962. *Report of the Advisory Committee: The development of the economic resources of Southern Rhodesia with particular reference to the role of African agriculture*. Salisbury: Southern Rhodesia Ministry of Native Affairs.

Arrighi, G. 1973. The political economy of Rhodesia. In *Essays on the political economy of Africa*, ed. G. Arrighi and J. Saul, 336–77. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Barber, W. J. 1961. *The economy of British Central Africa*. London: Oxford University Press.

Barnes, T. 1992a. The fight for control of African women's mobility in colonial Zimbabwe, 1900–1939. *Signs* 17:586–608.

———. 1992b. Ideologies and the construction of class amongst African women in colonial Zimbabwe, 1930–1960. African Studies Institute Seminar Paper. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.

Bond, P. 1994. Money, power and social movements: The contested geography of finance in Southern Africa. In *Money, power and space*, ed. S. Corbridge, R. Martin, and N. Thrift. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, forthcoming.

———. 1992a. Finance and uneven development in Zimbabwe. Ph.D. diss. Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, The Johns Hopkins University.

———. 1992b. Finance and uneven urban development in the Salisbury Central Business District. *Geographical Journal of Zimbabwe* 23, in press.

———. 1991. Geopolitics, international finance and capital accumulation: Zimbabwe in the 1980s and 1990s. *Tijdschrift voor*

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Economische en Sociale Ceografie 82 (5): 325–37.

Central Statistical Office. 1965. *Report on the urban African budget survey in Salisbury, 1963/64.* Report S/32/350. Salisbury: Government Printer.

———. 1948. Central bank for the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Unpublished report. Salisbury.

———. various years. *Census of production.* Salisbury: Government Printer.

———. various years. *Bulletin of statistics.* Salisbury: Government Printer.

Christopher, A. J. 1977. Early settlement and the cadastral framework. In *Salisbury: A geographical survey of the capital of Rhodesia,* ed. G. Kay and M. A. H. Smout, 14–26. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

———. 1970. Salisbury 1900: The study of a pioneer town. *Journal for Geography* 3:757–66.

Crush, J. 1991. The discourse of progressive human geography. *Progress in Human Geography* 15 (4):395–414.

Davenport, T. R. H. 1966. *The Afrikaner bond.* Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Davies, R. J., and Dewar, N. 1989. Adaptive or structural transformation? The case of the Harare, Zimbabwe housing system. *Social Dynamics* 15:46 60.

de Janvry, A. 1982. *The agrarian question and reformism in Latin America.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Drakakis-Smith, D. 1987. Urban and regional development in Zimbabwe. In *The socialist Third World: Urban development and territorial planning,* ed. D. Forbes and N. Thrift, 194–214. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Gann, L., and Gelfand, M. 1964. *Huggins of Rhodesa.* London: Allen and Unwin.

Giliomee, H. 1989. Aspects of the rise of Afrikaner capital and Afrikaner nationalism in the Western Cape, 187{}1915. In *The angry divide,* ed. W. James and M. Simons, 63–79. Cape Town: David Philip.

Grant-Suttie, R. I. 1965. The Rhodesias and Nyasaland. In *Commonwealth banking systems,* ed. W. F. Crick, 335–59. Oxford Clarendon Press.

Handford, J. 1976. *Portrait of an economy under sanctions, 1965–1975.* Salisbury: Mercury Press.

Harvey, D. 1985. *The urbanization of capital.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

———. 1982. *The limits to capital.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Kay, G., and Smout, M. A. H., eds. 1977. *Salisbury: A geographical survey of the capital of Rhodesia.* London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Keegan, T. 1986. *Rural transformations in South Africa.* Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Leys, C. 1959. *European politics in Southern Rhodesia.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Loney, M. 1974. *Rhodesia: White racism and imperial response.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Lupton, M. 1992. crisis, deracialisation and spatial restructuring: Challenges for South African radical geography. In *Geography in a changing South Africa: Progress and prospects,* ed. C. Rogerson and J. McCarthy, 95–118. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Mabin A. 1985. Concentration and dispersion in the banking system of the Cape Colony, 1837–1900. *South African Geographical Journal* 67 (2):141–59.

Mafico, C. J. C. 1987. *Urbanisation and low income housing in Zimbabwe: An historical perspective.* Working Paper 33. Liverpool: Department of Civic Design, University of Liverpool,

Murray, D. 1970. *The governmental system in Southern Rhodesia.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

O'Meara, D. 1983. *Volkskapitalisme.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Patel, D. H., and Adams, R. J. 1981. *Chirambahuyo: A case study in low-income housing.* Gweru: Mambo Press.

Pearson, D. S., and Taylor, W. L. 1963. *Breakup: Some economic consequences for the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.* Salisbury: The Phoenix Group.

Phimister, I. 1988. *An economic and social history of Zimbabwe, 1890–1948: Class struggle and capital accumulation.* London: Longman.

Schmidt, E. 1991. Patriarchy, capitalism, and the colonial state in Zimbabwe. *Signs* 16:732–56.

Smout, M. A. H. 1971. Service centres in greater Salisbury, Rhodesia. Ph.D. diss., Faculty of Science, University of London.

Soja, E. 1989. *Postmodern geographies.* London: Verso.

South African Communist Party. 1989. *The path to power.* London.

Sowelem, R. A. 1967. *Towards financial independence in a developing economy.* London: Allen & Unwin.

Steinberg, J.; van Zyl, P.; and Bond, P. 1992. Contradictions in the transition from urban apartheid: Barriers to gentrification in Jo-

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

hannesburg. In *The apartheid city and beyond*, ed. D. Smith, 266–78. London: Routledge.

Swilling, M. 1990. Deracialised urbanisation. *Urban Forum* 1 (2):15–38.

Thompson, C. H., and Woodruff, H. W. 1955. *Economic development in Rhodesia and Nyasaland*. London: Dennis Dobson.

van der Pijl, K. 1984. *The making of an Atlantic ruling class*. London: Verso.

van Onselen, C. 1976. *Chibarro*. London: Pluto Press.

Wolpe, H., ed. 1980. *The articulations of modes of production*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Zinyama, L. 1988. Human geography in Zimbabwe: A review of past research and current trends. *Geographical Journal of Zimbabwe* 19:59–79.

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:55:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms